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Abstract 
 The objective of the study was to establish the effect of corporate 
governance practices on earnings management of companies listed at the 
Nairobi Security Exchange (NSE).  The target population consisted of the 49 
companies that had been continuously and actively trading at the NSE 
between January 2010 and December 2012. Secondary data was used 
covering the period 2010 to 2012 and analyzed using linear regression to test 
the effect of the independent variables on the dependent variable. The study 
found that earnings management is negatively related to ownership 
concentration, board size and board independence but positively related to 
board activity and CEO duality.  The study recommended the need for 
effective corporate governance practices in listed companies in Kenya to 
contribute to reduced earnings management and avert possible collapse of 
listed companies in Kenya. 
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Introduction 
 In recent years large accounting frauds uncovered in the stock 
markets have once again confirmed the existence of ethical failures and the 
importance of transparency and reliability of the financial information 
provided to stock markets (Lang and Lundholm, 2000). The regulatory 
response to financial scandals has been to take measures to protect 
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information transparency, mitigate conflicts of interest and ensure the 
independence of auditors, all in order to protect the investors interests’ and 
increase the confidence of capital markets (Leuz, Nanda & Wysocki, 2003) . 
A weak corporate governance structure may provide an opportunity for 
managers to engage in behavior that would eventually result in a lower 
quality of reported earnings, which is a strong indication of a serious decay 
in business ethics (Jesus and Emma, 2013). 
 Corporate governance is the system by which companies are directed 
and controlled. Boards of directors are responsible for the governance of 
their companies. The shareholders' role in governance is to appoint the 
directors and the auditors and to satisfy themselves that an appropriate 
governance structure is in place (Cadbury Committee, 1992). Capital 
Markets Act of Kenya (Cap. 485A), defines corporate governance as the 
process and structure used to direct and manage business affairs of the 
company towards enhancing prosperity and corporate accounting with the 
ultimate objective of realizing shareholders long-term value while taking into 
account the interest of other stakeholders (CMA, 2002).  
 Gazette Notice No. 3362 to the Capital Markets Act of Kenya (Cap. 
485A) requires the following corporate governance practices in listed 
companies in Kenya; that every quoted company is headed by an effective 
board of directors and board committees, directors remunerations are 
established through formal and transparent procedures and approved by the 
shareholders. Such remuneration should also be competitive, linked to 
performance and sufficient to attract and retain diligent directors (CMA, 
2002). Other considerations include board size, board activities characterized 
by board meetings, appointment procedures, and board independence 
requiring that at least one-third of the directors should be independent and 
non-executive and of diverse background. Sufficient supply and disclosure of 
information is required on aggregate directors’ loans, ownership 
concentration listing ten major shareholders of the company, share options 
and other forms of executive compensation. 
 Earnings management is a strategy used by the management of a 
company to deliberately manipulate the company’s earnings so that the 
figures match a pre-determined target. This practice is carried out for the 
purpose of income smoothing. Thus rather than having years of 
exceptionally good or bad earnings, companies will try to keep the figures 
relatively stable by adding and removing cash from reserves account 
(Dechow et al., 1995). Stolowy and Breton (2004) define earning 
management as the use of management’s discretion to decide on accounting 
choices or to design transactions in a way that it will affect the chances of 
wealth transfer between the company and society, fund providers or 
managers. Fischer and Rosenzweiz (1995) gave a more precise definition of 
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earnings management where they stated that it’s the managers’ action which 
increase / decrease current reported earnings of a company financials with no 
corresponding increase / decrease in the longterm economic gain in the 
company. 
 The agency theory posits a negative relationship between corporate 
governance and earnings management. Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
indicated that the principals who are the company owners can comfort 
themselves that the agent will make the most favourable decisions only if 
appropriate incentives and rewards are given and only if the agent is 
watched. This in effect supports monitoring of management by the director 
who according to the stewardship theory hold the fiduciary duty of 
safeguarding shareholder’s interest. Higher monitoring by directors in their 
duty results to lower manipulation of earnings hence supporing a negative 
relationship between corporate governance and earnings management. The 
big bath theory of earnings management, however, suggests that firms 
experiencing low earnings in a given year may take discretionary write 
downs to reduce even further the current period’s earnings with the 
assumption that they can not be met with an extra punishment for the 
accelerated poor performance (Dye, 1986). Again this behaviour positively 
affects earnings management and can only be controlled by such firms 
practicing good corporate governance thus a negative relationship is further 
supported. The stakeholders theory leaves managers with immense 
uncontrolled power that positively affects earnings management to their 
advantage. Here again good corporate governance practices can help monitor 
management so as to safeguard accountability  and transparency and the 
integrity of financial reports free of earnings management. 
 Empirical studies have also concluded that various relationships exist 
between corporate governance and earnings management. Jesus and Emma 
(2013) observed that insider shareholding, ownership concentration, 
institutional investors, board independence, a greater number of board 
meetings negatively affects earnings management while family ownership, 
board size positively affects earnings management. The existence of 
concentration of power (CEO duality) increases earnings management while 
a country with higher levels of governability shows a lower level on earnings 
management practices (Bugshan, 2005). Liu and Lu (2007) documented 
systematic differences in earnings management across the China's listed 
companies during 1999–2005, and empirically demonstrated that firms with 
higher corporate governance levels have lower levels of earnings 
management. Their empirical findings, although not being able to completely 
exclude other explanations, strongly suggested that agency conflicts between 
controlling shareholders and minority investors account for a significant 
portion of earnings management in China's listed firms. 
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 The Nairobi Securities Exchange was constituted in 1954 as a 
voluntary association of stock brokers registered under the Societies Act. 
The firms listed at the NSE are classified into different sectors based on the 
nature of their activities and operations including agricultural, commercial 
and services, Banking, Insurance, Investment and the manufacturing, 
Construction and allied sector among others.  
 
The research problem 
 As a result of a series of high- profile cases of corporate collapses 
worldwide among them Enron and WorldCom in the US,  Marconi in the UK 
and Royal Ahold in the Netherlands, there has been an exponential increase 
in the amount of laws, rules and guidelines setting in place a heightened 
standard of corporate governance best practice (McConvill, 2005). Cases of 
corruption in Kenya have attracted lively debates in many legal and business 
sectors which have in result shaken both local and foreign investor 
confidence (Manyuru, 2005). According to Ogoye (2002), the increasing 
number of corporate failures and financial scandals has been caused by 
incompetence, fraud and abuse of office by the agents running the 
corporations.  
 In Kenya, cases where managers and directors have been accused of 
poor corporate governance resulting to corporate scandals include the 
collapse of Euro Bank in 2004, the placement of Uchumi Supermarkets 
under receivership in 2004 due to mismanagement, the near collapses of 
Unga Group, National Bank of Kenya and more recently board room 
wrangles and the discovery of secret overseas bank accounts for siphoning 
company money by some directors at CMC Motors (Madiavale, 2011). 
Hendrikse (2004) argue that the corporate failures witnessed recently 
confirmed that many directors put their own interests before those of the 
company and shareholders. In response the regulators have continuously 
spelt guidelines and regulations to ensure that there is prudential 
management in the organizations. This is in recognition that prior to 2002, 
poor management was one of the factors pointed out to be contributing to 
serious liquidity problems and collapse of public organizations in Kenya. 
 Several studies in corporate governance and earnings management 
have been undertaken internationally including Alghamdi (2012) who 
studied investigation into earnings management practices and the role of 
corporate governance and external audit in emerging markets from Saudi 
listed companies and, Jesus and Emma (2013) who studied whether 
corporate governance influenced earnings management in Latin American 
markets. Locally, there are many studies in corporate governance though 
none has focused on its relationship or effects to earnings management. Most 
studies have concentrated on profitability as a measure of financial 
European Scientific Journal January 2015 edition vol.11, No.1 ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print)  e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
173 
performance and the effects of corporate governance on performance of 
various sectors of the economy. A few studies among them Kaboyo (2013) 
and Irungu (2010) have looked at the factors motivating earnings 
management and the relationship between macro economic variables and 
earnings management for listed firms at the NSE. Unlike most corporate 
governance studies, this study focused on the control aspect of corporate 
governance rather than the performance enhancing aspect. The study focused 
on a period when managers in Kenya had an incentive to manage earnings 
due to the effect of macroeconomic factors in the country e.g. general 
election in 2013, interest rate escalation in 2011/2012 and foreign exchange 
depreciation in 2011. The research was guided by the question: What is the 
effect of corporate governance on earnings management of listed companies 
at the Nairobi Securities Exchange? 
 
Research objectives 
 The main objective of the study was to establish the effect of 
corporate governance practices on earnings management of companies listed 
at the Nairobi Securities Exchange (NSE). The specific objectives were to 
establish: 
i. the effect of ownership concentration on earnings management  
ii. the effect of board size on earnings management 
iii. the effect of board activities on earnings management 
iv. the effect of CEO duality on earnings management 
 
Research methodology 
General Background and Population of the Study 
 In order to look at the corporate governance practices and their 
associations or relationship with earning management by quoted companies 
at the NSE, this study adopted a descriptive research design.  Descriptive 
research design is concerned with finding out “what is” and can either be 
quantitative or qualitative since it involves gathering data that describes 
events and then organizes, tabulates, depicts and describe the data collection. 
Although there are 61 currently quoted companies at the NSE, the target 
population consisted of the 49 companies that had been continuously and 
actively trading at the NSE between January 2010 and December 2012. The 
study adopted a census study approach due to the small population selected.  
 
Data Collection Method and Instruments 
 The study used secondary quantitative data to analyze the 
relationship between corporate governance and earnings management. 
Secondary data was obtained by abstraction method from corporate 
governance statements and financial statements for the 49 companies 
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covered as they were published by NSE. This data covered the period 2010 
to 2012. The data was collected from the published results of the selected 
companies and included the number of directors, number of meetings held in 
each study year, major shareholders’ composition, proposition of executive 
and non executive directors in the board and CEO duality status while 
financial data included total assets, net revenue, accounts receivables, cash 
flow from operations and property, plant and equipment. 
 
Data Analysis Technique  
 The data collected was analyzed using linear regression analysis to 
test the relationship between the discretionary accruals as an earnings 
management tool and specific corporate governance variables assumed to fit 
the NSE. The regression results were interpreted based on the Pearson 
correlation, adjusted R-squared, Test of significance using F statistic, 
coefficients of the independent variables and their p-values. 
 The measure of discretionary accrual (Earnings Management tool) 
used in this study was as applied previously by Jesus and Emma (2013) 
based on the Dechow et al. (1995) discretionary accruals model as follows:-  
 EMj = TAj/Aj – [α0 (1/Aj) + α1 ((∆REVj -∆RECj) /Aj) + α2 (PPEj/Aj)]  
Where: 
TA is the total accruals  
A is the beginning of year total assets  
∆REV is the change in net revenue 
∆REC is the change in accounts receivables  
PPE is property, plant, and equipment  
j denote the firm 
α0, α1 and α2 are the parameters for each variable 
EMj = Discretionary Accrual (Earnings Management).     
 
The Regression equation was modeled as follows;  
 EM=β0 +β1(X1) +β2(X2) +β3(X3) +β4(X4) +β5(X5) + ε    
Where-:  
  EM is the discretionary accrual variable representing Earnings 
Management. 
   β represents the parameters for each variable.  
X1: Ownership Concentration measured by proportion of ownership held 
by the main shareholder of institutional nature of the quoted company.  
X2: Board Size measured by the total number of directors in the board. 
X3: Board Independence measured by the proportion of non executive 
directors inside the board (non executive directors / total directors). 
X4: Board Activity measured by number of board meetings held during 
the year. 
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X5: CEO Duality measured by a dummy value of 1 if the company CEO 
also pairs up as the Board Chair and 0 if otherwise. 
ε : Standard error term.  
 
Results of research and discussions 
Regression Results 
 Table 1 below shows adjusted R2 of 0.667 indicating that all the 
independent variables taken together explain about 66.7% of the variations in 
earning management. The overall model is significant as shown by F statistic 
of 15.911 with a p<0.05. This implies that all the independent variables taken 
together can help predict earning management. 
 Test of the slope using t test was also undertaken and indicate that the 
coefficients of  aggregate Earnings Management is negative and significant, 
indicating that holding Ownership Concentration, Board Size, Board 
Independence, Board Activity and CEO Duality constant Earnings 
Management will be -5.08. The study also found that a unit increase in 
ownership concentration will cause a 5.53 decrease in earnings management, 
further a unit increase in board size will lead to a decrease in earnings 
management by  0.42, a unit increase in board independence will lead to an 
decrease in  earnings management by  a factor of 6.94, a unit increase in 
board activity will lead to an increase in earnings management by a factor of 
0.020 and a  unit increase in CEO Duality will further lead to an increase in 
earnings management by a factor of 2.98. All the predictor variables are 
significant with p<0.05. The predicting equation therefore can be given by: 
 Y= -5.08-5.53X1-0.42 X2-6.94 X3+0.02X4+2.98 X5 
 where Y= Earnings Management 
B0= intercept, X1= Ownership Concentration, X2= Board Size, X3= 
Board Independence,       X4= Board Activity and X5= CEO Duality 
Table 2: Regression Results of Corporate Governance Practices and Earning Management 
 Model 1a 
Constant -5.08 (.028) 
Ownership Concentration -5.53(.020) 
Board Size -0.42(.048) 
Board Independence -6.94(.000) 
Board Activity 0.02 (.026) 
CEO Duality 2.98 (.001) 
Adjusted R2 0.667 
F 15.911(.000) 
    p – values in parenthesis 
Predictors: Ownership Concentration, Board Size, Board Independence, Board Activity and 
CEO Duality 
Dependent Variable: Earnings Management 
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Discussion of Findings 
 The findings suggest that the presence of block holders could 
effectively monitor the management to avoid their opportunistic behaviour 
including earnings management, the study result are consistent with the 
findings of Demsetz and Lehn (1985). The findings also show that board 
independence is negatively related to earnings management. That is, adding 
outside directors to the board may improve in governance practices since 
they are helpful to the board in monitoring the firm’s management of 
earnings consistent with the findings of Beasley (2006) and Chen (2004).  
 The positive and significant relationship between CEO duality and 
earnings management is consistent with the findings of Dechow et al. (2006) 
and Finkelstein and D’Aveni (2003). The negative association between board 
size and earnings management is similar to the findings of Xie et al. (2003) 
and Chtourou et al. (2001) who found that larger boards are strongly 
associated with lower levels of earnings management an increase in board 
size improves the board’s monitoring capacity.  
 
Conclusion of the Study 
 The study conclude that that a unit increase in ownership 
concentration will cause a decrease in earnings management, a unit increase 
in board size will lead to a decrease in earnings management, a unit increase 
in board independence will lead to a decrease in earnings management, a unit 
increase in board activity will lead to an increase in earnings management 
and a unit increase in CEO duality will further lead to an increase in earnings 
management. 
 
Policy Recommendations 
 From the findings and conclusions, the study recommends the need 
for effective corporate governance practices at senior managerial level of 
listed companies in Kenya to contribute to reduced earnings management 
and hence improve on actual firm liquidity and avert possible collapse of 
public organizations in Kenya. 
 
Recommendation for Further Studies 
 Further studies should be undertaken to explore earnings 
management for non-listed companies in Kenya and large family run private 
companies in Kenya. The findings would be very useful to the tax authorities 
in their pursuit to net more taxes and widen the tax base.  
 An opportunity arises for further research in the development of an 
experiment that would identify how average investors measure earnings 
management. This is because it is unclear whether investors use abnormal 
accruals, as measured by aggregate accruals approach, as a representation of 
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earnings management. The complexity of such models suggests that the 
average investor is unlikely to use this measure.  
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